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An empirical evaluation is presented of two competing flexible labour
supply models. The first is a standard unitary model, while the second is
based on the collective approach to household behaviour. The evaluation
focuses on the testing of the models’ theoretical implications and on their
ability to identify structural information, like preferences and the intra-
household allocation process. Models are applied to Dutch microdata from
the DNB Household Survey. The unitary model cannot be rejected for
male and female singles, while it is rejected for a sample of couples. The
alternative collective model cannot be rejected for the same sample, allow-
ing identification of individual preferences and an intrahousehold sharing
rule that can be used as a basis for welfare economic policy evaluations.
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1 Introduction
The traditional approach to household behaviour assumes that households be-
have as if they were single decision makers. Consequently, household consump-
tion and labour supply are considered to be the observable result of the max-
imization of unique rational preferences, constrained by a household budget
restriction.
This unitary approach, however, seems to act as an empirical straitjacket for
household behaviour; its theoretical implications of homogeneity, symmetry and
negative semidefiniteness of the Slutsky matrix were repeatedly rejected when
confronted with the data (see Blundell and Meghir, 1986, and Blundell and
Walker, 1986, for some evidence in labour supply models, and Blundell, 1988,
for evidence in consumption allocation models). Apart from these theoretical
restrictions, the unitary model implies the so-called ‘income pooling hypothesis’.
This asserts that the source of a household’s nonlabour income does not affect
observed allocations. This restriction too has been repeatedly rejected by the
data (see, e.g., Lundberg, 1988, Thomas, 1990, and Fortin and Lacroix, 1997).
But the unitary model also suffers from welfare economic deficiencies. For
example, it cannot shed any light on the intrahousehold distribution of consump-
tion or welfare. Apps and Rees (1988) and Brett (1998) have shown, however,
that when evaluating the welfare effects of tax changes, intrahousehold distrib-
utional effects can in general not be ignored. Moreover, Alderman et alii (1995)
argue that accepting the unitary model, when it is inappropriate, has more
serious consequences for policy prescriptions than rejecting the unitary model
when it is appropriate. In programs that target individuals in certain groups
(e.g. women or children), knowledge of the intrahousehold decision process may
be especially important.
A valuable alternative to the unitary model is the collective approach to
household behaviour. In the collective household model, as initially defined by
Chiappori (1988, 1992), it is explicitly recognized that many person households
consist of several individuals who may have different preferences. Among these
individuals, a household bargaining process takes place that is assumed to be
Pareto efficient. Chiappori (1988, 1992) showed that even this rather weak as-
sumption is able to generate testable implications on labour supply that differ
from those of the unitary model. Moreover, the repeated rejections of symme-
try and negativity can be interpreted somewhat, since the latter are not to be
satisfied in the collective model (see Browning and Chiappori, 1998). Given
its particular set-up, the collective model incorporates a natural answer to the
empirical and welfare economic disadvantages of the unitary model. (See Ver-
meulen, 2002, for a more elaborate survey of the collective approach.)
This paper has the objective of balancing the above two competing theories
in a household labour supply context. The question can be asked, however,
when is a theory of household behaviour a good theory? Two rather neutral
basic requirements are the following (see Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994).
First, one should expect a theory of household behaviour to generate testable
implications that are potentially rejectable. Apart from the ability to save on
degrees of freedom, these restrictions can be used to test the adequacy of the
theory. A second requirement is that a theory of household behaviour should
be able to recover some structural information, like preferences or the intra-
household allocation process. Knowledge of preferences or the intrahousehold
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allocation process may be important, since these can be used as a basis for
normative welfare analyses.
As to the above requirements, the unitary model passes with flying colours.
Firstly, it generates its well-known testable restrictions on demand. Secondly,
demand that satisfies these restrictions can be shown to be integrable to a ra-
tional preference ordering. Also the collective household model meets the above
requirements to some extent. In Chiappori (1988), Browning et alii (1994) and
Browning and Chiappori (1998), to give only a few examples, testable and re-
jectable implications of the model are derived. As to the second requirement,
integrability results are less strong than in the unitary model. Extra assump-
tions, apart from Pareto efficiency of household decisions, are needed to recover
a great deal of the intrahousehold allocation process and individual preferences.
More specifically, a necessary condition for such an identification result is that
individual preferences of the household members are of the ‘egoistic’ or the
Beckerian ‘caring’ type (see, for example, Chiappori, 1992).
We will evaluate the unitary and collective approaches by means of the above
requirements of good theories. Firstly, attention will be focused on the estima-
tion and testing of both a unitary and a collective labour supply model. This
will be done on three samples of households from the 1995-2003 waves of the
Dutch DNB Household Survey, which was formerly known as the CentER Sav-
ings Survey. The first two samples consist of male and female singles with a pos-
itive labour supply, since for these groups of households, the unitary approach
should be entirely applicable. The second sample consists of couples where both
individuals have a positive labour supply. In general, the unitary and collec-
tive approaches should have different implications on observable behaviour for
this sample. In order not to reject the theoretical implications of the models
because of a too restrictive specification of labour supply, flexible labour supply
models that are generalizations of the linear expenditure system are opted for.
Estimation and testing of the unitary model does not pose too many problems
in the given set-up. As for its competitor, in the first instance account will
be taken of general individual preferences, allowing public consumption, and
externalities within a household. This is a different approach than Fortin and
Lacroix (1997), who start from a collective labour supply model where egoistic
and caring preferences are assumed from the outset. On the other hand, our
approach is on a par with Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002). To test the col-
lective model, we will make use of the robust distribution factor proportionality
test of Bourguignon et alii (1993). This test makes use of so-called ‘distribu-
tion factors’, which are defined as variables that influence the intrahousehold
distribution process, but that do not directly affect individual preferences or
the household budget constraint. Examples of such distribution factors are laws
on alimony, child benefits, tax laws that differ according to marital status and
individual nonlabour incomes (that affect the household budget constraint only
indirectly through a change in total household nonlabour income).
Secondly, as already mentioned, the identification of individual preferences
and the intrahousehold allocation process requires egoistic or caring preferences
in the collective approach. Therefore, the general collective labour supply model
will be reformulated in terms of these types of preferences. Again useful testable
restrictions can be derived. Note however, that a rejection of these restrictions
does not necessarily imply that the collective model is rejected. If the above dis-
tribution factor proportionality test is not rejected, a rejection of the additional
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restrictions may be considered as a rejection of the particular egoistic or caring
preferences, rather than a rejection of the collective approach.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the func-
tional specifications for unitary and collective labour supply models, which are
chosen for the empirical evaluation. Data and econometric issues are discussed
in Section 3. Section 4 gives empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Household labour supply: two competing em-
pirical approaches
In what follows, we focus on households consisting of two working-age individu-
als who both participate in the labour market. The unitary and collective labour
supply approaches that will be dealt with are static within-period models in a
cross-sectional context. Consequently, the only price variation that is assumed
to be observable are the wages of both individuals. Moreover, we assume that
these hourly wage rates do not depend on hours worked, which gives rise to
simple linear budget constraints. Note also that the models focused on are not
embedded in the household production theory, where individuals derive utility
from, among others, domestic goods that are produced within the household
by means of domestic labour and market goods (see Apps and Rees, 1997 and
Chiappori, 1997, for examples of such models in a collective context).
Apart from the choice of an appropriate theory to model household labour
supply, a functional form for the models has to be chosen. Given this paper’s ob-
jective, the functional specifications should satisfy at least three criteria. Firstly,
labour supply should be consistent with utility maximization (both in the uni-
tary model and in the collective approach for singles) or with the collective
setting (for couples). Secondly, there should be some flexibility in the func-
tional form, even if (most of) the unitary or collective restrictions are imposed
upon it. With regard to changes in the wage rates, a variety of responses should
be allowed. Finally, a normative welfare analysis requires judgements on the ef-
fect of policy reforms on the household’s or the individual’s welfare. Therefore,
structural information like utility functions should be recoverable by means of
the specification. In what follows, we opt for functional forms for the unitary
and collective model that only coincide for single individual households. The
approach followed here is different from that of Fortin and Lacroix (1997), who
derived a labour supply model that nests a unitary and a collective model. This
approach has the advantage that both models are easily tested against each
other. On the other hand, their model does not allow much flexibility in be-
havioural responses. Our approach does not encompass a unitary and collective
model in the same functional specification for many person households. The gain
in flexibility comes at the cost of both models being less easily tested against
each other.
2.1 A unitary labour supply model
Traditionally, a household’s preferences are assumed to be representable by a
well-behaved utility function that is unique up to a monotone increasing trans-
formation. The functional specification that is opted for here, is based on Blun-
dell and Meghir’s (1986) generalization of Stone-Geary preferences. It allows a
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wide variety of wage responses, and demographic variables are easily incorpo-
rated. The indirect utility function for two income earners A and B, underlying
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where y is the household’s nonlabour income, wI is the hourly wage rate of in-
dividual I (I = A,B), p is the price of a Hicksian aggregate commodity and d is
a vector of demographic and taste shifter variables (e.g. age and education level
of the household members). The functions a and b are linearly homogeneous







A + α2 (d)w














¢β1 ¡wB¢β2 pβ3 , (2)













ij = 0 and
P
i βi = 1. Demographic
variables are only taken up in a in order not to complicate matters too much.
We obtain the following labour supply functions (where the price of consumption
is normalized to one) via Roy’s identity:

































∗ ¡wA, wB,d¢ = a(wA, wB, 1,d). Symmetry of the
Slutsky matrix is satisfied if γ12 = γ21. As is well-known for flexible functional
forms, concavity cannot be imposed globally without losing flexibility. There-
fore, we opt to estimate the above labour supplies without imposing concavity
restrictions and then check whether these are satisfied for the given data. Note
that if γij (i, j = 1, 2) are equal to zero, then the above labour supply system
reduces to the linear expenditure system. Note finally that the above specifi-
cation does not include distribution factors, since these cannot play any role in
the unitary approach by definition.
Specifications for the indirect utility function and labour supply function for
singles are obtained by setting the parameters associated with, say, wB equal
to zero in equations (1), (2) and (3).1
1As usual in applied demand analysis, additive error terms are tagged to the labour supply
equations in the empirical exercise. See Lewbel (2001) for (relatively loose) necessary and
sufficient conditions for rationality of econometrically estimated demand, given that consumers
are rational with preferences that may differ arbitrarily across agents. However, since a test
of these conditions requires long panel data on household purchases, we cannot test these
conditions by means of our data.
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2.2 Collective labour supply models
2.2.1 A short theoretical digression
The general approach In the collective approach to household behaviour,
both household members A and B have their own rational preferences over
consumption and leisure bundles. These preferences can be very general in that
they may be defined over both one’s own consumption and leisure and the
consumption and leisure bundle of the other household member. Individual




cA, cB , lA, lB,d
¢
, (5)
where vI is a twice continuously differentiable, strongly concave utility function
with individual consumptions of the Hicksian aggregate commodity cA and cB
and the leisure amounts lA and lB as arguments (where lI = T−I (I = A,B); T
being the individuals’ time endowment and I hours worked). The utility func-
tion vI is assumed to be strictly increasing in cI and lI , I = A,B. Externalities
in consumption and leisure can be both positive and negative. Therefore, vI is
not necessarily increasing in cJ and lJ , for J 6= I. The (full) household budget
constraint equals:
cA + cB +wAlA +wBlB ≤ y +wAT +wBT. (6)
Since individual preferences are assumed to be represented by strongly con-
cave utility functions and the household budget constraint defines a convex set,
the utility possibility set is strictly convex. Therefore, each Pareto efficient
household allocation, as a core assumption of the collective approach, can be
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(7)
+(1− µ (y,w, z,d)) vB ¡cA, cB, lA, lB,d¢
subject to
cA + cB +wAlA +wBlB ≤ y +wAT +wBT,
where the welfare or bargaining weights µ and (1− µ) are assumed to be contin-





Other arguments of these weights are the vectors d and z =(z1, ..., zm)
0. The
latter is a vector of distribution factors, different from demographic variables
d. Distribution factors are defined as variables that affect the welfare weight
attached to household members, but that do not have any direct influence on
the household members’ preferences or the household budget constraint.
In Browning and Chiappori (1998), a test of the collective model is derived,
which is based on the so-called pseudo-Slutsky matrix. However, since this test
requires at least five different commodities, we cannot make use of it in the
current setting.
An alternative test for the collective labour supply model can be derived,
though. The test makes use of the properties of the variables z. As is clear from
equation (7), this vector only occurs in the bargaining weights µ and (1− µ)
and does not enter individual preferences or the household budget constraint.
This implies the following test for the collective labour supply model:
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fit into the collective household approach and distribu-




θ0 for r = (z2, ..., zm)
0
and θ a vector of dimension (m− 1). The latter vector captures the marginal
substitution effects between z1 and every element of r in the function µ.
Proof : See Bourguignon et alii (1993) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(2002).
The result thus says that the ratios of marginal effects of the distribution
factors on both individual labour supplies are equal. This general restriction
on the given collective model is easily tested. Note, however, that the result is
fundamentally driven by the fact that at least two separate distribution factors
z can be observed.
Identification results: the sharing rule interpretation It is a well-known
result of the unitary model that if demand functions add up, are homogeneous
of degree zero and have a symmetric and negative semidefinite Slutsky matrix,
then these are integrable to a rational preference ordering. In the collective
approach, more assumptions are needed to obtain a similar result. More specif-
ically, individual preferences have to be of the egoistic or caring type.
Household members have egoistic preferences if their preferences only depend
on their own consumption and leisure:
uI = vI
¡
cI , lI ,d
¢
, I = A,B. (8)
Preferences are of the caring type if they can be represented as (see Becker,
1974a, 1974b):










, I = A,B, (9)
where fI is an increasing function in its arguments. These preferences allow a
favourable re-interpretation of the collective labour supply model:
Proposition 2 Sharing rule result. If individual preferences are of the egoistic
or caring type, then the household allocation problem (7) is equivalent to the









cI +wI lI ≤ φI (y,w, z,d) +wIT,
for some function φ such that φA = φ and φB = y − φA.
Proof : See Chiappori (1992).
The result can be interpreted as a two-stage budgeting process. Firstly,
household members allocate the total nonlabour income y among each other
according to the sharing rule φ. Following the above results on the bargaining
power of the individuals, φ will in general depend on total nonlabour income,
wages, distribution factors z and demographic variables d. In a second stage,
both individuals allocate their share in the household’s means to their own con-
sumption and leisure in a way that maximizes their individual welfare.
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, individual labour supplies can be written as:
A = mA
¡





y − φ (y,w, z,d) , wB,d¢ .
Let ψ denote a vector of dimension (m+ 3), with typical element ∂φ
∂fi
; fi being
an element of the vector f =(y,w0, z0)0. The above representation of labour
supply produces the following result:
Proposition 3 Testability and identification results. Assume that the partial
derivatives of the labour supply functions are not equal to zero. Then the follow-
ing conditions are necessary for A and B to be compatible with the individual




















∂ (y − φ)
B ≥ 0.
Moreover, if the conditions (12) and (13) are satisfied, then the sharing rule is
identified up to an additive constant k (d). For a given constant k (d), individual
preferences are uniquely defined.
Proof : See Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002).
The intuition, behind which these conditions are derived is the following.
The obtained results are entirely driven through the applicability of the sharing
rule result when preferences are egoistic or of the caring type. Firstly, as is clear
from (11) marginal changes in nonlabour income y and distribution factors z
only affect individual labour supplies A and B via the individuals’ shares in
total nonlabour income. Secondly, a marginal change of a household member’s
wage has only an income effect on the other one’s labour supply. This effect
runs again through the individuals’ shares of total nonlabour income. Taken
together, these results allow one to derive the marginal rates of substitution,
between each couple of variables in f , of the sharing rule φ in terms of observable
labour supplies A and B. By means of this set of marginal substitution rates,
the partial derivatives of the sharing rule φ (i.e., the elements in ψ) can be
derived. In order to make this set of partial differential equations integrable
to φ, a set of cross-equation restrictions has to be satisfied. This is captured
by (12). Since labour supplies A and B can also be considered as resulting
from utility maximization problems (10), standard integrability conditions on
the associated Slutsky matrices have to be satisfied. This is given by (13).
Thus, if the above conditions are satisfied, then the sharing rule φ is identified
up to an additive constant. Consequently, the individual consumptions of the
Hicksian aggregate commodity cA and cB are also identified up to the same
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additive constant. Moreover, keeping in mind the sharing rule result, individual
indirect utility functions can also be defined for the given additive constant, via
observable labour supply behaviour.2
2.2.2 Functional specification
We choose a specification for the collective model that implies that if the above
collective restrictions are satisfied, then the individuals in couples have the same
specification for the indirect utility function as singles (cf. singles’ version of
equations (1), (2) and (3)). This requirement is satisfied for the following flex-
ible functional specification for individual labour supplies (where the price of
consumption has been normalized to one):















lnwA − lnwB¢+ γ6]















where γ4 and δ4 are two vectors of dimension m.
In the empirical section, three distribution factors will be used (i.e., m = 3).














where γ4;i and δ4;i are the ith elements of respectively γ4 and δ4.
Let us now consider the more specific setting of the sharing rule interpreta-
tion, where individual labour supplies can be considered as the observable result
of a two-stage budgeting process (see Proposition 3). Via the partial derivatives
of the individual labour supply functions, the following set of partial derivatives



























for i = 1, 2, 3.
2These results imply enough information to determine the qualitative effects of tax reforms
on individual utilities (see, e.g., Chiappori, 1992). However, tax reform analyses by means
of inequality indices or social welfare functions at the individual level will in general depend
on the unknown constant. One possible way out is to conduct a sensitivity analysis, where
inequality indices are calculated for some (plausible) values of this constant.
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The denominator of the above equations has to be different from zero in the
collective setting. This can be easily tested.
Let us denote the vector
¡
y, wA, wB , z0
¢0
by f and capture the right-hand























A necessary and sufficient condition to integrate the above set of partial differen-
tial equations back to the sharing rule, is that the matrix ∂ψ
∂f 0 is symmetric. This
is always satisfied for the chosen specification. The sharing rule φ is identified,





(δ4;1y + 2γ4;1δ5 lnw
A − 2γ5δ4;1 lnwB (19)
+2γ4;1δ4;1z1 + 2γ4;2δ4;1z2 + 2γ4;3δ4;1z3) + k (d) .
Second stage individual labour supply functions and individual indirect util-
ity functions for the chosen specification can now be derived by means of the
next proposition:
Proposition 4 Second stage individual labour supply functions. If the restric-
tions γ4;1 = −δ4;1, γ4;2 = −δ4;2, γ4;3 = −δ4;3 and γ5 = −δ5 are satisfied, then
second stage individual labour supplies, corresponding to (11), are derived from
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bB (wB)
(21)





































Coefficients of these indirect utility functions are identified as follows: αA1 (d) =
γ1 (d) , γ
A
11 = γ2, β
A
1 = γ3, α
B
1 (d) = δ1 (d) , γ
B
11 = δ2 and β
B
1 = δ3. The
coefficients αA2 and α
B
2 cannot be identified by means of observable labour supply,
since they depend on the additive constant k (d).
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Proof : See Appendix A.
Second stage labour supply functions are thus of the same form as the uni-
tary labour supply functions for singles (see (3) or (4)). Consequently, welfare
evaluations at the intrahousehold level of changes in wages or other exogenous
variables can be done by means of the Gorman polar form individual utility
functions (20) and (21) which are identified for any given k (d). Note that the
functional specification does not directly allow to test for negativity since the
Slutsky effects are a function of φ, which is unobservable. However, such a test
is possible for given values of the constant k (d).
3 Data and econometric issues
The above unitary and collective labour supply models are estimated and tested
on the 1995-2003 waves of the Dutch DNB Household Survey. This yearly sur-
vey, which was formerly known as the CentER Savings Survey, is representative
for the Dutch population and contains a very rich amount of economic, socio-
demographic and psychological variables.3 From this dataset, three samples of
households are kept back. Both labour supply approaches are applied to a sam-
ple of childless two person households of which both individuals have a positive
labour supply.4 The sample is further restricted to households of which both
members are between 18 and 65 years old. Also the self-employed are excluded.
After deleting observations with important missing information, this results in
a sample size of 680 couples. Since the unitary model should be applicable to
single person households in both approaches, two samples of participating male
and female singles, without children, between 18 and 65 years old and who are
not self-employed act as a type of benchmark. Sample sizes are respectively
equal to 894 and 536 for male and female singles. Summary statistics of the
three different subsamples are given in Tables 8 and 9 of Appendix B.
Wage rates are obtained by dividing the individual labour incomes by the
number of hours worked. In order to avoid a division bias, wages are treated as
endogenous variables and are instrumented by work experience (years employed
and the square of years employed), the square of age and dummies capturing
the individuals’ education level.
Three distribution factors were taken up in the collective labour supply
model. These are the age difference between both household members, a dummy
variable indicating whether the individuals are married or cohabiting, and the
share of the male’s individually assignable nonlabour income in the household’s
3We did not make use of the panel structure of the data during the estimations. The reason
for this choice is that there are relatively too few households that were observed in a fairly
large number of waves of the DNB Household Survey. E.g., more than 40% of the households
in the selected sample appear in only one wave.
4The approach of focusing on households with working individuals may be subject to sam-
ple selection bias. Following Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), we ignore this potential
bias; mainly because of the fact that the nontrivial extension of the collective model to non-
participation is beyond the scope of this empirical exercise. See Blundell et alii (2001), Donni
(2003), Vermeulen (2003) and Vermeulen et alii (2003) for alternative collective labour supply
models that explicitly take account of corner solutions. We further do not concentrate on
households with children. Tests on consumption data for collective rationality of households
with more than two persons can be found in Dauphin and Fortin (2001) and Browning and
Chiappori (1998). Testability and identification results with respect to public goods (or more
specifically expenditures on children) are discussed in Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2002).
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total nonlabour income.5 Remark that the latter variable allows for a deviation
from the income pooling hypothesis of the unitary model, which implies that
the source of the nonlabour income does not have any influence on observed
household choices. The three distribution factors are used to test the collec-
tive restrictions of equation (16) and of Proposition 4. Note that it may be
problematic to find convincing distribution factors. Contrary to the exercise in
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), an index capturing divorce laws (or laws
on alimony) cannot be used for the Netherlands, since the whole country has
the same legislation on divorce and alimony. A possible critique on the marriage
dummy in the current exercise may be that it captures preference differences
between individuals who are married and individuals who are cohabiting.
Age and dummies for geographical regions are taken up as demographic
and taste shifter variables in the labour supply equations (3), (4), (14) and
(15). Linear specifications for the functions α1 (d), α2 (d), γ1 (d) and δ1 (d)
were chosen. Estimations are done with the generalized method of moments
(GMM).
4 Empirical results
4.1 The unitary model
4.1.1 Single person households
Table 1 gives parameter estimates and standard errors of the estimation of the
unitary model for single males and females (cf. singles’ version of (3)).6 Let us
start with a discussion of the males’ estimates. As is clear from the table, about
half of the parameters are significantly estimated. A 100 euro increase in the
weekly nonlabour income of a single man, with an average wage, significantly,
although far from substantially, decreases his labour supply by a fraction of an
hour. Living in the southern region increases average labour supply by about
one hour, when compared to living in one of the three largest cities (Amsterdam,
Rotterdam or The Hague). Also the parameter associated with the own wage is
significantly estimated. It is, however, less easily interpreted. Therefore, we will
focus on elasticities further in the paper. Since the γ11-parameter is significantly
estimated, the LES labour supply specification is rejected at any conventional
significance level. The sign of the compensated wage effects was checked for
each male in the subsample. These wage effects have the right positive sign for
all 894 observations, so that Slutsky conditions are at least locally satisfied for
this sample.
5This variable of course captures observable information and should not be confused with
the implicit share in the household’s nonlabour income resulting from the intrahousehold
allocation process.
6 In principle, the model is completely identified. For the given sample, however, there
was a problem to estimate the parameter associated with the Hicksian aggregate commodity
(because of too little variation in some (combinations of) explanatory variables). Therefore,
this parameter has been assigned a value of -50. Filled into the labour supply equation, this
can be interpreted as committed (subsistence) expenditure on household consumption of 50
euro per week. Some sensitivity tests with respect to this parameter were conducted; values
were set at different levels between 0 and 100. Neither of the alternatives resulted in substantial
changes of the obtained estimates; this both with respect to parameter values and significance
levels.
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For single women, it turns out that age has a significantly estimated, but
not very important, negative impact on labour supply. Living in Amsterdam,
Rotterdam or The Hague, on the other hand, increases average weekly labour
supply by respectively 2 and 3 hours, when compared to living in the western and
northern regions outside one of these cities. Note that the parameter associated
with the own wage is not significantly estimated; implying that the LES labour
supply specification cannot be rejected for single women. Finally, only 23 of the
536 observations do not have the expected positive compensated wage effect.
Summarizing, it is clear that the unitary model performs rather well for both
male and female singles. In what follows, we turn attention to couples.
Table 1: Estimates singles
Males (894 obs.) Females (536 obs.)
Constant 38.48 (1.00)** 39.65 (1.73)**
Wage effect γ11 0.05 (0.02)** 0.81 (6.73)
Nonlabour income effect β1 0.01 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.01)
Age -0.02 (0.02) -0.08 (0.03)**
Dummy western region 0.11 (0.53) -1.93 (0.83)**
Dummy northern region 0.55 (0.77) -2.86 (1.29)**
Dummy eastern region 1.47 (0.98) 0.36 (0.81)
Dummy southern region 1.15 (0.53)** -0.44 (0.94)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are beween brackets. Living in one of the three largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) serves as reference category for the geo-
graphical dummies. A(n) (double) asterisk denotes significance at the ten (five) percent
significance level.
4.1.2 Two person households
GMM estimation results for the unitary model applied to the sample of two per-
son households are given in Tables 2 and 3 (see equations (3) and (4)).7 About
half of the parameters are significantly estimated at conventional significance
levels. The own wage has a significantly estimated impact for men in both sets
of estimates. Again, this variable will be interpreted further in the paper by
means of elasticities. For women, age has a significantly estimated negative
effect on female labour supply. Further, living in one of the three largest cities
implies a higher labour supply than living in one of the other regions. This
effect ranges from a higher labour supply of about two to four hours.
It is important for the theoretical consistency of the model that a Wald
test cannot reject symmetry (test statistic of 0.16 < χ20.05(1) =3.84). The
LES labour supply specification (γ11=γ12=γ21=γ22=0) is strongly rejected by
means of a Wald test in both unrestricted and restricted versions (test statistics
of respectively 13.62 and 13.90 > χ20.05 (4)=9.49). Finally, concavity conditions
are not satisfied for 420 of the 680 households in the sample for the unrestricted
labour supply version. In the symmetry restricted version, Slutsky conditions
7Note that the parameter associated with the Hicksian aggregate commodity has been
set equal to -100 to make the committed expenditure comparable to that of single person
households. Here also, a sensitivity analysis did not show substantial changes in magnitude
and significance of parameter estimates.
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are not satisfied for 514 households. Note the important difference between
these results and the estimation results for singles, with a similar functional
specification, where Slutsky conditions are not satisfied for only a marginal
fraction of the singles.
To summarize, it is clear that the unitary model seems to perform better
when applied to singles than when applied to couples. This indicates that there
is indeed something wrong with the aggregation assumptions that underly this
model for multiperson households. In the following subsection, we will check
whether the collective model is a valuable alternative to the unitary model.
Table 2: Unrestricted estimates unitary model couples (680 obs.)
Males Females
Constant 34.47 (4.20)** 52.62 (7.06)**
Own wage effect γii (i = 1, 2) -51.22 (15.58)** 6.75 (36.06)
Partner’s wage effect γij (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j) 18.83 (12.73) 9.72 (20.56)
Nonlabour income effect βi (i = 1, 2) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Age men -0.04 (0.07) -0.06 (0.12)
Age women -0.01 (0.05) -0.22 (0.10)**
Dummy western region 0.74 (0.58) -2.32 (1.03)*
Dummy northern region -0.03 (0.86) -4.24 (2.01)**
Dummy eastern region 0.95 (0.69) -1.89 (1.15)*
Dummy southern region 0.29 (0.64) -2.04 (1.18)*
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are beween brackets. Living in one of the three largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) serves as reference category for the geo-
graphical dummies. A(n) (double) asterisk denotes significance at the ten (five) percent
significance level.
Table 3: Symmetry restricted estimates unitary model couples (680 obs.)
Males Females
Constant 34.49 (4.15)** 50.96 (5.50)**
Own wage effect γii (i = 1, 2) -49.11 (14.12)** -3.86 (23.97)
Partner’s wage effect γij (i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j) 16.77 (11.27) 16.77 (11.27)
Nonlabour income effect βi (i = 1, 2) 0.03 (0.02)* 0.03 (0.02)
Age men -0.03 (0.07) -0.04 (0.10)
Age women -0.01 (0.05) -0.23 (0.10)**
Dummy western region 0.74 (0.58) -2.36 (1.02)**
Dummy northern region -0.03 (0.84) -4.34 (1.99)**
Dummy eastern region 0.96 (0.69) -1.89 (1.15)*
Dummy southern region 0.29 (0.63) -2.04 (1.18)*
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are beween brackets. Living in one of the three largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) serves as reference category for the geo-
graphical dummies. A(n) (double) asterisk denotes significance at the ten (five) percent
significance level.
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4.2 The collective model
In Tables 4 to 6 GMM estimation results are shown for three versions of the
collective labour supply model: an unrestricted version of the model (see (14)
and (15)), the collective labour supply model with distribution factor propor-
tionality restrictions (16) imposed and the collective model with the restrictions
of Proposition 4 imposed. Quite some parameters are significantly estimated;
especially in the restricted estimates as could be expected. Consistent with the
unitary model’s estimates, an increase in a household’s nonlabour income, de-
creases labour supply of both individuals. If a household’s nonlabour income
increases by 100 euro per week, then men, with average wages, reduce their
labour supply by about one hour per week, according to the unrestricted esti-
mates. The same conclusion can be drawn for women in the restricted estimates.
Also age has a strong negative impact on labour supply for both sexes.
Let us now turn attention to the testing of the collective restrictions. By
means of the Wald test, distribution factor proportionality (see equation (16))
cannot be rejected in the unrestricted version of the collective labour supply
model at the 5% significance level (test statistic of 0.35 < χ20.05 (2) = 5.99).
Consequently, the theoretical implications of the general collective household
model cannot be rejected for the given sample. Moreover, in both the unre-
stricted version and the collective model with distribution factor proportionality
imposed, the hypothesis of second stage individual labour supplies derived from
Gorman polar form preferences (see Proposition 4) cannot be rejected. Test sta-
tistics are respectively 0.47 and 0.16 and are to be compared to χ20.05 (4)=9.49
and χ20.05 (2)=5.99). As already discussed, concavity conditions on second stage
individual labour supplies cannot be directly checked since these depend on the
integration constant k (d). Some indication of the validity of these restrictions
might be obtained by testing the sign of compensated wage responses for k (d)
fixed to some number. If this unknown constant is fixed at 300 euro for every
household, for example, then concavity is not satisfied for only 7 men and 9
women in the sample; for a fixation at 200, we obtain a rejection for 34 men and
4 women.8 Finally, a test for the denominator of the sharing rule (17) being
different from zero, strongly rejected equality of the parameters associated with
the male’s share in nonlabour income in both labour supply equations. The test
statistic equals 4.09 and is to be compared with χ20.05 (1)=3.84. Consequently, it
seems that the assumption of egoistic or caring preferences of individuals in cou-
ples is not too strong. This is an important result from a welfare economic point
of view, since intrahousehold welfare evaluations of changes in the explanatory
variables can be done by means of the individual indirect utility functions (20)
and (21). Summarizing these testing results, one can conclude that the collec-
tive model at hand seems to be a valuable alternative to the unitary model for
couples which was rejected for the same data.
As has been shown earlier, if individual preferences are of the egoistic or
caring type, then the observed household allocation can be seen as the implicit
result of a two-stage budgeting process. First, household members allocate total
8Note that this constant k (d) may differ over different houshold types, implying the pos-
sibility that every individual’s behaviour may be consistent with rationality for well-chosen
values of this constant. Some distributional characteristics of the sharing rule and its im-
plications on individual consumption levels for different values of this constant are given in
Appendix C.
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household nonlabour income among each other according to some sharing rule,
while in a second stage, each individual maximizes her utility subject to her
share in total nonlabour income. Partial derivatives of the sharing rule (19),
associated with the chosen parameterization, can be found in the estimation
results of the third version of the collective model in Table 6. These partials
can be interpreted as follows. First of all, being married implies a significant
increase of 167 euro per week in the implicit share going to women in compari-
son with cohabitation. In terms of household bargaining, one might argue that
marriage improves the bargaining position of women in comparison with cohab-
itation. Also the age difference has a positive impact on the share in nonlabour
income going to women. There is a (not significantly estimated) positive effect
on the weekly transfer to women of about 4.6 euro per year difference. Some-
what counterintuitive is that also the male’s share in nonlabour income has a
significantly estimated favorable impact on the share accruing to women. An
increase of the male’s share by 10% implies an increase of the women’s share
of about one euro. Finally, at mean wage rates, an increase of the hourly wage
rate of men by 1 euro, implies a (not significantly estimated) increase of the
share going to women of about 90 euro per week.
Table 4: Unrestricted estimates collective model (680 obs.)
Males Females
Constant 39.83 (5.20)** 47.24 (8.60)**
Own wage (γ2 and δ2) -21.42 (13.43) -3.50 (26.72)
Nonlabour income (γ3 and δ3) 0.09 (0.05)* 0.06 (0.04)
Dummy married -115.57 (186.40) 338.70 (446.0)
Age difference -5.51 (7.23) -2.41 (14.81)
Male’s share in nonlabour income -9.50 (6.29) 11.09 (7.35)
Difference in log wages -275.91 (238.6) 369.75 (415.7)
Age -0.09 (0.05)* -0.23 (0.08)**
Dummy western region 0.89 (0.64) -2.12 (1.11)*
Dummy northern region 0.05 (1.07) -3.58 (2.20)
Dummy eastern region 1.16 (0.81) -1.70 (1.35)
Dummy southern region 0.35 (0.76) -1.83 (1.31)*
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are beween brackets. Living in one of the three largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) serves as reference category for the geo-
graphical dummies. A(n) (double) asterisk denotes significance at the ten (five) percent
significance level.
4.3 Elasticities
Table 7 provides elasticities for the different labour supply models with the
above theoretical restrictions imposed. Let us start with a discussion of the
elasticities of singles. Mean own wage elasticities are positive, although rather
small, for both single men and women. As could be expected, leisure turns out
to be a normal commodity, since the income elasticities derived from the labour
supply equations are negative.
As is clear from the table, couples’ elasticities obtained by means of the
unitary and collective models are qualitatively very similar. According to both
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Table 5: Distribution factor proportionality estimates collective model (680
obs.)
Males Females
Constant 41.06 (4.95)** 50.87 (7.04)**
Own wage (γ2 and δ2) -20.22 (12.67) 6.29 (22.16)
Nonlabour income (γ3 and δ3) 0.10 (0.05)** 0.07 (0.04)*
Dummy married -116.24 (160.10) 152.12 (216.6)
Age difference -3.16 (5.78) 4.13 (7.62)
Male’s share in nonlabour income -7.93 (7.10) 10.38 (6.17)*
Difference in log wages -254.73 (202.7) 307.18 (322.5)
Age -0.10 (0.05)** -0.27 (0.06)**
Dummy western region 0.91 (0.66) -2.22 (1.09)**
Dummy northern region 0.12 (1.14) -3.67 (2.15)*
Dummy eastern region 1.22 (0.85) -2.12 (1.26)*
Dummy southern region 0.44 (0.80) -2.03 (1.28)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are beween brackets. Living in one of the three largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) serves as reference category for the geo-
graphical dummies. A(n) (double) asterisk denotes significance at the ten (five) percent
significance level.
Table 6: Gorman polar form estimates collective model (680 obs.)
Males Females
Constant 40.23 (4.38)** 50.99 (6.02)**
Own wage (γ2 and δ2) -19.38 (12.00) 5.94 (20.73)
Nonlabour income (γ3 and δ3) 0.09 (0.04)** 0.07 (0.03)**
Dummy married -166.88 (176.1) 166.88 (176.1)
Age difference -4.61 (6.42) 4.61 (6.42)
Male’s share in nonlabour income -9.91 (4.50)** 9.91 (4.50)**
Difference in log wages -262.23 (201.8) 262.23 (201.8)
Age -0.10 (0.04)** -0.27 (0.05)**
Dummy western region 0.85 (0.63) -2.21 (1.09)**
Dummy northern region -0.13 (1.07) -3.55 (2.12)*
Dummy eastern region 1.08 (0.79) -2.07 (1.24)*
Dummy southern region 0.31 (0.76) -1.98 (1.27)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are beween brackets. Living in one of the three largest
cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) serves as reference category for the geo-
graphical dummies. A(n) (double) asterisk denotes significance at the ten (five) percent
significance level.
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models, men seem to be on the backward bending part of the labour supply
curve. Women, on the other hand, have a fairly large positive mean wage elas-
ticity. Mean cross-wage elasticities are negative for both sexes in both models.
Finally, the models agree on the income elasticities, which are negative for men
and women; implying that leisure is a normal commodity for couples or indi-
viduals in couples.
Table 7 also shows elasticities that are calculated by means of the second
stage labour supply functions (see Proposition 4). They can be interpreted as
elasticities with the sharing rule φ kept constant. Of course, this sharing rule
is only observed up to an additive constant k (d). Therefore, the elasticities
are calculated with this constant equal to 300, the value earlier used to test
concavity of the individual utility functions. Total elasticities can in this way be
disentangled in a part stemming from a marginal change in wages or nonlabour
income with the sharing rule held constant, and a part originating from a shift
in nonlabour income from one individual to the other (i.e., due to a change in
bargaining power). As is clear from the table, the bargaining power does not
entail sign reversals between both sets of elasticities, but has some quantitave
effect on the different elasticities.
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Table 7: Elasticities
Mean 1st quart. Median 3rd quart.
UNITARY MODEL MALE SINGLES
Own wage 0.007 (0.045) 0.002 0.003 0.004
Nonlabour income -0.004 (0.038) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
UNITARY MODEL FEMALE SINGLES
Own wage 0.003 (0.017) 0.003 0.004 0.004
Nonlabour income -0.002 (0.01) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
UNITARY MODEL COUPLES
Males
Own wage -0.03 (0.06) -0.06 -0.03 -0.01
Partner’s wage -0.07 (0.03) -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
Nonlabour income -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Females
Own wage 0.27 (0.24) 0.16 0.20 0.30
Partner’s wage -0.14 (0.12) -0.16 -0.11 -0.09
Nonlabour income -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
COLLECTIVE MODEL COUPLES
Males
Own wage -0.01 (0.07) -0.05 -0.02 0.00
Own wage with sharing rule constant -0.07 (0.05) -0.10 -0.08 -0.06
Partner’s wage -0.06 (0.03) -0.07 -0.06 -0.05
Nonlabour income -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Nonlabour income with sharing rule constant -0.03 (0.03) -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Females
Own wage 0.26 (0.24) 0.14 0.19 0.28
Own wage with sharing rule constant 0.35 (0.31) 0.20 0.27 0.38
Partner’s wage -0.09 (0.07) -0.10 -0.08 -0.06
Nonlabour income -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
Nonlabour income with sharing rule constant -0.05 (0.06) -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
Note: Standard errors beween brackets.
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5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to empirically evaluate two competing ap-
proaches to household labour supply. The first approach is the standard unitary
model where households are assumed to behave as single rational decision mak-
ing units. An alternative to this traditional model is the collective approach.
In this approach, as initially defined by Chiappori (1988, 1992), it is explicitly
taken into account that many person households consist of several individu-
als with own rational preferences. Among these individuals, a Pareto efficient
intrahousehold bargaining process is assumed to take place.
The empirical evaluation focused on the testing of implied theoretical re-
strictions of both models and on the ability to identify structural information,
like preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process. Flexible functional
specifications were derived for both approaches. For the unitary model, labour
supply functions come from preferences that can be represented by an indi-
rect utility function of the Gorman polar form. Testable implications of this
unitary labour supply model are standard restrictions on the Slutsky matrix.
As to the collective model, we followed the approach of Chiappori, Fortin and
Lacroix (2002), who derived a collective labour supply model with distribution
factors. The latter are defined as variables that affect the intrahousehold distri-
bution process, but that do not have any direct effect on individual preferences
or the joint household budget constraint. By means of these distribution fac-
tors, testable implications of the collective approach can be derived. If some
additional restrictions on the chosen parameterization of the collective model
are satisfied, then utility function specifications for individuals in couples and
singles in the unitary model coincide.
Both models were applied to a sample of couples where both members have a
positive labour supply, coming from the 1995-2003 waves of the DNB Household
Survey, which was formerly known as the CentER Savings Survey. Since the
unitary model should be entirely applicable to singles, the former was also tested
on samples of male and female singles. In the collective labour supply model, a
variable capturing whether the household members are married or cohabiting,
the age difference between individuals and the share of the male’s individual
nonlabour income in the couple’s total nonlabour income were taken up as
distribution factors. Estimations were done by means of the generalized method
of moments.
Since symmetry is not a theoretical restriction for singles, the only restriction
incorporated by the unitary model is the requirement of positive compensated
wage effects. These were of the correct sign for all male singles in the sample.
Only for a small fraction of the women’s sample, compensated wage effects
were of the wrong sign. Consequently, it can be argued that, at least locally,
the unitary model could not be rejected for single person households. As to
the theoretical implications of the unitary model for two person households,
symmetry could not be rejected at conventional significance levels. However,
Slutsky sign restrictions were not satisfied for about two thirds of the sample.
The fact that the unitary model is not rejected for singles, but rejected when
applied to couples data, is really important since it may indicate that there is
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indeed something wrong with the usual aggregation assumptions in the unitary
model. Note that the same conclusion was obtained by Browning and Chiappori
(1998) in a consumption context.
As for the collective model, the general collective restriction of distribution
factor proportionality could not be rejected for the given sample. Moreover,
the restrictions associated with the important assumption of egoistic or caring
preferences of the individual household members could not be rejected. These
results imply the collective approach being a valuable alternative to the rejected
unitary model for couples; a conclusion on a par with Browning and Chiappori
(1998).
A second criterion that was focused on to evaluate the unitary and the
collective models is the ability to identify structural information. If observed
labour supply satisfies the usual unitary restrictions, then it can be integrated
back to rational household preferences. This is important for welfare economic
evaluations of policy reforms at the household level. A similar integration result
applies to the collective model if individual preferences are of the egoistic or
caring type. In this case, household labour supply behaviour can be modelled
as a two stage budgeting process. Firstly, household members allocate total
household nonlabour income among each other according to some sharing rule.
In a second stage, both individuals maximize individual preferences subject to
the implied individual budget constraints. If preferences are egoistic or caring,
then this sharing rule is identified up to an additive constant, while individual
preferences are uniquely identified for a given constant. Some main results
connected with this sharing rule interpretation of the collective model are the
following. Being married in comparison to cohabiting implies a substantial
increase of the implicit share going to women. Also the age difference between
men and women, the share of the male’s individual nonlabour income in the
total nonlabour income, and the wage difference between men and women have a
favourable effect on the share of total nonlabour income going to women. Not all
these effects are significantly different from zero, though. Note that the ability
to gain information on the intrahousehold allocation and the implications of it
on individual welfare, is an important comparative advantage of the collective
approach. Since the crucial assumption of egoistic or caring preferences could
not be rejected, welfare analyses cannot only be done at the household level,
but also in terms of individual welfare levels.
Future research may test whether the above results are robust with respect
to other functional forms that can describe the same variety in observed labour
supply behaviour. Another research avenue is the incorporation of nonparticipa-
tion into the collective model (see, e.g., Blundell et alii, 2001 and Donni, 2003).
Note that this option has the positive by-product of generating extra observa-
tions for the sample, which might benefit the precision of estimated parameters.
Another path for future research is the modelling of expenditures on children
and other public goods within a household (see Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir,
2002). Finally, the collective model in the current study does not take into ac-
count household production (see Apps and Rees, 1997, and Chiappori, 1997).
The simple dichotomy between market time and leisure may be an inadequate
assumption in modelling household labour supply. The increasing availability of
time budget studies may enhance the empirical modelling of household labour
supply incorporating household production.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 4.
Firstly, taking account of the restrictions γ4;1 = −δ4;1 and γ5 = −δ5 and
rewriting the sharing rule (19) results in:
1
2
y = φ− γ4;1z1 − γ4;2z2 − γ4;3z3 − γ5
¡
lnwA − lnwB¢− k (d) . (23)
Substituting the right-hand side of equation (23) for 12y in individual A’s col-
lective labour supply function (14) results in









2wA + γ6 − k (d)), (24)
which is easily seen to be derived from A’s indirect utility function (20) with
parameters αA1 (d) = γ1 (d) , γ
A
11 = γ2, β
A
1 = γ3 and α
A
2 = γ6 − k (d).
Second, taking into account γ4;1 = −δ4;1, γ4;2 = −δ4;2, γ4;3 = −δ4;3 and




y = y − φ− δ4;1z1 − δ4;2z2 − δ4;3z3 − δ5
¡
lnwA − lnwB¢+ k (d) . (25)
Substitution of the right-hand side of (25) for 12y in the collective labour supply
function of individual B (15) gives








which corresponds to individual B’s labour supply derived from the indirect
utility function (21) with parameters αB1 (d) = δ1 (d) , γ
B
11 = δ2, β
B
1 = δ3 and




Table 8: Sample statistics male and female singles
Males (894 obs.) Females (536 obs.)
Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Weekly working hours 37.29 5.03 34.67 6.44
Net hourly wage rate 10.64 8.06 9.42 5.04
Age 40.80 9.01 41.32 10.64
Years employed 18.59 12.36 18.14 12.46
Dummy primary education 0.11 0.11
Dummy secondary education 0.39 0.27
Dummy non-academic higher education 0.29 0.43
Dummy academic higher education 0.21 0.19
Dummy three largest cities 0.32 0.28
Dummy western region 0.27 0.29
Dummy northern region 0.07 0.09
Dummy eastern region 0.18 0.15
Dummy southern region 0.16 0.18
Weekly nonlabour income 103.96 783.70 111.97 174.53
Note: Monetary variables are in 2003 euro. Three largest cities are Amsterdam, Rotterdam
and The Hague.
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Table 9: Sample statistics two person households (680 obs.)
Males Females
Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Weekly working hours 37.73 4.50 30.68 8.56
Net hourly wage rate 11.32 4.87 8.67 3.45
Age 42.77 10.50 40.47 10.32
Years employed 22.26 12.89 17.05 10.53
Dummy primary education 0.15 0.13
Dummy secondary education 0.38 0.44
Dummy non-academic higher education 0.30 0.32
Dummy academic higher education 0.17 0.11
Dummy three largest cities 0.17 0.17
Dummy western region 0.34 0.34
Dummy northern region 0.07 0.07
Dummy eastern region 0.20 0.20
Dummy southern region 0.21 0.21
Dummy married 0.74 0.74
Weekly nonlabour income 89.24 117.98 57.12 64.96
Note: Monetary variables are in 2003 euro. Three largest cities are Amsterdam, Rotterdam
and The Hague.
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Appendix C: Distributional characteristics shar-
ing rule and individual consumption
Table 10: Distributional characteristics of sharing rule
Variable φ
k (d)= 300 k (d)= 200
Mean 162.63 62.63
Standard deviation 184.59 184.59
First quartile 58.19 -41.81
Median 155.50 55.50
Third quartile 272.82 172.82
Note: Values in cells are in 2003 euro per week.
Table 11: Distributional characteristics of male consumption
Variable cA
k (d)= 300 k (d)= 200
Mean 585.56 485.56
Standard deviation 176.61 176.61
First quartile 466.61 366.61
Median 571.81 471.81
Third quartile 676.87 576.87
Note: Values in cells are in 2003 euro per week.
Table 12: Distributional characteristics female consumption
Variable cB
k (d)= 300 k (d)= 200
Mean 245.24 345.24
Standard deviation 169.49 169.49
First quartile 146.51 246.51
Median 250.69 350.69
Third quartile 341.14 441.14
Note: Values in cells are in 2003 euro per week.
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